COMMENTARY by Litan, Robert E.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 19
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
Global Trends Toward Universal Banking:
Comparative Bank Regulation/Meeting The
Regulatory Challenge
Article 10
9-1-1993
COMMENTARY
Robert E. Litan
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Robert E. Litan, COMMENTARY, 19 Brook. J. Int'l L. 229 (1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol19/iss1/10
COMMENTARY
Robert E. Litan*
It's a pleasure to comment on the paper by John Macey. He
always writes provocative and interesting stuff, and this paper is
no exception.
I should say at the outset that Macey has succeeded in dis-
arming me from giving any major criticism since he's cited my
work in many places. Very clever, John. Nevertheless, I have to
say something to earn my airfare, so here it goes.
Macey's paper advances two major points. First, that re-
gardless of the legal niceties, market forces are driving the
United States banking system toward the universal banking
model. And second, that because of the current legal niceties -
which John persuasively argues are not likely to change any time
soon due to the weakened political power of the banking indus-
try - banks, as we know them today, ironically, will not partici-
pate in the trend toward universal banking. Instead, the univer-
sal banks of today and tomorrow are and will be the non-
banking giants, such as General Motors (GM), General Electric
(GE), Sears, Ford Motor - not Citicorp, Bank of America or
Nationsbank. There are elements of truth in these two proposi-
tions but I have a few reservations.
I want to start out, however, with a brief digression on what
we mean by "universal banking." Macey says it means expanded
powers for banks, and that is literally true; universal banks in
the German model actually can use deposits to fund investments
in other non-banking activities. But elsewhere in the paper, Ma-
cey seems to imply that universal banking can also be carried
out by bank holding companies or non-banking parents that
may own a bank-type, deposit-taking enterprise, such as a thrift.
Thus, it is in this broadened sense that Ford Motor is a univer-
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sal bank because it owns First Nationwide. A similar claim can
be made for GM or GE, which own their own credit card banks.
In short, under the narrow definition of universal banking,
the bank is directly involved with the non-banking activity;
whereas under the broader definition, the bank is affiliated with
the non-banking enterprise.
To those who believe in the "one happy family" theory of
corporate enterprise, this is a legal distinction without a practi-
cal difference. That is, if firewalls are useless or ignored, then it
doesn't matter whether the non-banking activity is inside or
outside the bank. Either way, the bank may be adversely af-
fected by the failure of the non-bank, or benefited if the non-
bank does well.
However, for those who believe that firewalls can be effec-
tive, it does make a difference whether the non-banking activity
is located inside or outside the bank. In particular, if you believe
in firewalls and are concerned about the possibility that
problems at non-banks may infect the bank, then you would
prefer the affiliation version of universal banking over the Ger-
man model of direct bank participation in non-bank enterprises.
This is also true if you believe, as I do, that a safe version of
universal banking is the "narrow banking" model, whereby
banks narrowly investing in safe, liquid securities are given the
right to affiliate with any other type of non-banking enterprise.
Incidentally, it is still possible in the narrow bank model for the
overall organization to benefit from economies of scope, since
the narrow bank and the affiliates could use the same offices and
personnel and cross-market each others' services.
Now, I want to turn to a couple of comments on Macey's
basic thesis that universal banking is inevitable. Again, defini-
tions are important. If by universal banking Macey means bank
participation in just securities underwriting, then he certainly is
correct. Bank holding companies already have Section 201 pow-
ers to carry out this activity, with some restrictions. I predict
that, while Congress is unlikely during the Clinton Administra-
tion to repeal Glass-Steagall, we will see the Federal Reserve
further relaxing the current restrictions on the Section 20 affili-
ates in the next couple of years.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to the Banking Act of
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Section 20 of the Act is codified, as amended, at 12
U.S.C. §377 (1988).
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Moreover, such a move would be in the public interest. Ma-
cey makes clear - crystal clear - that securities finance is re-
placing bank-dominated finance, not just in the United States,
but to an increasing degree in Japan and Europe as well.2 And
equally important, the skills in extending a loan and underwrit-
ing a securities issue are virtually identical. Thus, it makes little
sense to preclude banks from underwriting securities.
Let's get a little more ambitious and ask whether we are
likely to see banks, affiliated with the full range of financial ser-
vice activities - such as insuranci agency, underwriting, real es-
tate agency and development. This is the so-called "one-stop"
shopping model much talked about in recent years.
There is no question that many of the non-banking compa-
nies I have mentioned have already engaged in aspects of bank-
ing. But the jury is still out on whether one-stop shopping
makes economic sense, as Helen Garten suggests in her paper.3
In fact, several recent developments suggest that many Ameri-
can consumers may not want one-stop financial shopping. Sears,
a company that Macey cites in his article as an example of
American-style universal banking, has just announced its inten-
tion to divest its financial divisions.4 American Express, another
aspirant to universal banking, also has had its share of troubles.
And while a number of European banks have rushed into the
arms of insurance companies, and vice versa, it is still far from
clear whether these marriages will prove financially fruitful.
Incidentally, Macey seems to think that the skills for suc-
ceeding in banking and insurance are transferable.5 While a
banking organization can certainly benefit from sharing cus-
tomer lists for the two activities, it is not true that selling or
underwriting insurance requires the same skills as attracting de-
positers and making loans.
In short, we still don't know to what extent banks and non-
banks will want to diversify broadly into each others' businesses
and what combinations will prove most economically attractive.
2. On this point, see the excellent analysis in International Monetary Fund, Inter-
national Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Policy Issues (Washington,
D.C., 1992).
3. See Helen A. Garten, Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 159 (1993).
4. Suzanne Bilello, Sears to Spend $4B to Remake Stores, NEWSDAY, February 12,
1993, at 50.
5. Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking,
19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 203 (1993).
1993]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
Presumably, Macey would answer that this is an issue we should
let the market decide, and, fundamentally, I would agree with
him.
At the same time, however, there is danger in mixing bank-
ing, finance, and commerce, more so than is true today. The risk
is that the federal safety net will thereby get extended to cover
not just banks, but a much broader sector of the economy. I con-
tinue to believe that the best way of preventing this from hap-
pening is to allow only the narrow banking version of universal
banking, which would insulate banks and the federal insurance
fund from any financial difficulties experienced by non-banking
activities. One missing element in Macey's excellent paper is a
statement as to which universal banking model he would pre-
scribe for the United States, and whether any of the models ac-
tually matter.
Finally, I have a couple of observations on the three policy
reforms that Geoffrey Miller recommended in his comments on
Professor Lichtenstein's paper.6 First, I question the willingness
of banks to issue "double-liability" or "assessable" common
stock. This is particularly true at the present time when many
large banks have been reluctantly selling their non-assessable
common stock in order to bring themselves safely into compli-
ance with stiffer capital requirements.
Second, I also question the advisability of scaling back de-
posit insurance. In my view, depositors are highly unstable
sources of discipline because they can run on a moment's notice.
Holders of longer-term subordinated (and uninsured) debt pro-
vide a much more stable source of discipline precisely because
they cannot run, but instead must wait until their debt matures
to recover their investment.
For this reason, I strongly favor requiring all large banks -
perhaps those with assets above $1 billion that currently have
access to the capital markets - to meet part of their capital
requirement by issuing subordinated debt. For example, two
percent of the eight percent Tier II risk-weighted capital re-
quirement could be made up of subordinated debt. Such a re-
quirement would mean that any large bank that wanted to ex-
pand its deposit base would constantly have to go to the market
6. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervi-
sion of Financial Conglomerates, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 137 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 197 (1993).
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to sell its subordinated debt. That market, in turn, would dis-
courage large banks from taking many of the risks they became
accustomed to taking during the 1980s.
Finally, I fully agree with Geoffrey Miller and Jonathan Ma-
cey that nationwide interstate branching and banking is long
overdue. There is no rational reason for the current geographic
restrictions, which only have contributed to the weakness of the
United States banking system.
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